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The article referred to follows immediately with consent.

#### WHY BALAGUER WON—ANATOMY OF A REVOLUTION THAT FAILED

(By Selden Rodman)

(NOTE.—Selden Rodman, poet and art critic, is the author of *Quisqueya*, the only complete history of the Dominican Republic in any language. His most recent book, *The Road to Panama*, was published last month.)

SANTO DOMINGO.—At 8 p.m. on election night the scene in the lobby of the Embajador Hotel was hilarious. The count on the blackboard, containing returns from a dozen polling places in the capital, had Juan Bosch leading 6,347 to Joaquín Balaguer's 4,031. Jules Dubois, correspondent of the *Chicago Tribune*, had just announced that Balaguer would win by a landslide. The other newspapermen and TV reporters were laughing uproariously.

#### DOMINICAN REPUBLIC RELATIONS AND FOREIGN AID

(Mr. CURTIS (at the request of Mr. ANDREWS of North Dakota) was granted permission to extend his remarks at this point in the Record and to include extraneous matter.)

Mr. CURTIS. Mr. Speaker, I commend to the attention of my colleagues an article in the *New Republic* of June 18 by Selden Rodman, titled "Why Balaguer Won, Anatomy of a Revolution That Failed." Mr. Rodman is the author of a history of the Dominican Republic and is familiar with recent events in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Rodman reports his interview with key Dominican political figures and analyzes Joaquín Balaguer, a conservative candidate, defeated the seeming liberal favorite, Juan Bosch, in the recent elections. The defeat of Bosch came as a surprise to many and occasioned rumors that the elections had been unfair. Mr. Rodman makes clear why the Dominican voters chose Balaguer.

Of particular interest are Rodman's conclusions about the future of Dominican development as a prosperous democratic state. Rodman advises that:

Basic social reforms, heavy taxation of large landed estates that produce nothing, and the creation of an honest, nonpolitical civil service, are equally necessary. Reform of the educational system, which was never sound and is now in almost complete disarray, is still more basic to the future.

With regard to American financial aid, Rodman recommends that "the massive flow of American money now supporting the government and the economy be redirected in such a way as to emphasize self-help and grass roots initiative." But most important, Rodman points out an essential difference between government and private aid efforts in the Dominican Republic. He describes the work of the International Development Foundation, a consortium of 14 private American foundations, in financing a series of pilot projects in the Dominican Republic and other Latin nations.

In contrast to AID, which can't build a single school room for less than \$2,000, IDP is now building 11 complete schools, with thatched roofs, for a total cost of \$2,000. One hundred eighty-five village leaders have already received training from IDP to build

The Embajador, it should be noted, is the source of most news and all scuttlebutt in the Dominican Republic. It is also the headquarters of Ambassador-at-Large Ellis North Bunker, liaison between the OAS occupation forces and Provisional President Héctor García Godoy, who took office September 3, 1965, terminating the armed confrontation between General Antonio Imbert's improvised right-wing regime and Colonel Francisco Caamaño Desfó's embattled rebels in downtown Santo Domingo. The Embajador is the only tourist hotel in the republic which is operational. And like almost everything else physically substantial in this country, it was built (and bugged) by Generalissimo Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina in the final splurge of bread-and-circuses that preceded his assassination May 30, 1961.

It was not so much the disparity between Dubois' cocky statement and the early returns that was causing the laughter; it was rather the product of a certain overconfidence on the part of the liberals, the residue of an emotional attitude dating back to the week of revolution and intervention (April 24-30, 1965): Bosch should win. After all, had he not been the first freely elected president since the 30 years' terror ended? Had he not overwhelmed in the December 1962 election the very people who were now supporting Balaguer. Had not he (Bosch) been overthrown by a committee of Trujillista generals eight months later? Had not the April revolution erupted to bring Bosch back? And was not his opponent Trujillo's last hand-picked puppet? All true, incontestably. But the newsmen, who had opposed the American intervention a year ago April almost to a man, were making from these facts a shaky deduction. They were reasoning that the charisma that blazed in absentia around the craggy features and white thatch of Juan Bosch had survived intact from those heroic April days right through all the events of the 13 months that followed. They were making little, if any, allowance for the following chain of events:

When the April revolution broke out spontaneously, people had momentarily forgotten (and perhaps rightly so) that Bosch had been an extremely weak, ambivalent president. When he was ousted by General Weslin's *camarilla* and driven unceremoniously from the capital September 25, 1963, hardly a voice had been raised and not a shot was fired to protest his ejection. But in the joy of April, 1965 attending the fallen idol's imminent return, Bosch was suddenly as popular as he had ever been.

Unfortunately Bosch did not return. He did not take command of the street-fighters and disaffected army officers, and that was the first minus-quantity in the unstable equation of the newsmen. As everyone knows, *machismo* (male courage) is more